Slide
Centre Interdisciplinaire
de Recherche et d’Innovation
en Cybersécurité et Société
de Recherche et d’Innovation
en Cybersécurité et Société
1.
Mehrban, A.; Moudoud, H.; Brik, B.; Khoukhi, L.; Houda, Z. A. El
Game-Theoretic Security Orchestration for Cross-RIC Policy Conflicts in O-RAN Article d'actes
Dans: IEEE Int Conf Commun, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2026, ISBN: 15503607 (ISSN); 979-831954209-0 (ISBN), (Journal Abbreviation: IEEE Int Conf Commun).
Résumé | Liens | BibTeX | Étiquettes: Computation theory, Computer system firewalls, Cryptography, Game theory, Game-theoretic, Multiple vendors, Network architecture, Network security, Networks security, Open radio access network, Open RAN, Policy conflict, Radio access networks, Security orchestration, Service management, Service orchestration, SMO, Xapp/rapp conflict, xApp/rApp conflicts
@inproceedings{mehrbanGameTheoreticSecurityOrchestration2026,
title = {Game-Theoretic Security Orchestration for Cross-RIC Policy Conflicts in O-RAN},
author = {A. Mehrban and H. Moudoud and B. Brik and L. Khoukhi and Z. A. El Houda},
url = {https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105045343135?origin=resultslist},
doi = {10.1109/ICC59461.2026.11587926},
isbn = {15503607 (ISSN); 979-831954209-0 (ISBN)},
year = {2026},
date = {2026-01-01},
booktitle = {IEEE Int Conf Commun},
publisher = {Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.},
abstract = {In Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN), disaggregated network components can interact through specialized xApps or rApps from multiple vendors. Despite the flexibility of operations and the dynamism of functions enabled by the open architecture, this openness can cause conflicts in security policy enforcement (e.g., encryption levels, key rotation, firewall restrictiveness), formally defined as thresholded divergences on shared or interdependent security parameters, where one app wants to set a stricter rule while another wants a more lenient policy simultaneously. The current solutions of "first-come"or "last-write"make the change one-sided for the benefit of a single app, while other apps may be harmed by the result, and at a network level, security and stability can be compromised. In this paper, we propose a novel Game-Theoretic Security Orchestrator (GTSO) that operates at the Service Management and Orchestration (SMO) layer, with cross-RIC scope, and is responsible for resolving parameter conflicts across xApps and rApps. GTSO treats xApps/rApps as strategic players and negotiates convergent solutions using game-theoretic models such as non-cooperative Nash games, cooperative bargaining, and leader-follower (Stackelberg) that guide competing control applications toward stable equilibrium points, while exchanging strategy summaries over secure channels to protect sensitive details and enhance overall network security. © 2026 IEEE.},
note = {Journal Abbreviation: IEEE Int Conf Commun},
keywords = {Computation theory, Computer system firewalls, Cryptography, Game theory, Game-theoretic, Multiple vendors, Network architecture, Network security, Networks security, Open radio access network, Open RAN, Policy conflict, Radio access networks, Security orchestration, Service management, Service orchestration, SMO, Xapp/rapp conflict, xApp/rApp conflicts},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
In Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN), disaggregated network components can interact through specialized xApps or rApps from multiple vendors. Despite the flexibility of operations and the dynamism of functions enabled by the open architecture, this openness can cause conflicts in security policy enforcement (e.g., encryption levels, key rotation, firewall restrictiveness), formally defined as thresholded divergences on shared or interdependent security parameters, where one app wants to set a stricter rule while another wants a more lenient policy simultaneously. The current solutions of "first-come"or "last-write"make the change one-sided for the benefit of a single app, while other apps may be harmed by the result, and at a network level, security and stability can be compromised. In this paper, we propose a novel Game-Theoretic Security Orchestrator (GTSO) that operates at the Service Management and Orchestration (SMO) layer, with cross-RIC scope, and is responsible for resolving parameter conflicts across xApps and rApps. GTSO treats xApps/rApps as strategic players and negotiates convergent solutions using game-theoretic models such as non-cooperative Nash games, cooperative bargaining, and leader-follower (Stackelberg) that guide competing control applications toward stable equilibrium points, while exchanging strategy summaries over secure channels to protect sensitive details and enhance overall network security. © 2026 IEEE.
2.
Davoust, A.; Rovatsos, M.
Social contracts for non-cooperative games Article d'actes
Dans: AIES 2020 - Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, p. 43–49, Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, 2020, ISBN: 978-1-4503-7110-0.
Résumé | Liens | BibTeX | Étiquettes: Agent society, Agents, Behavioral research, Ethical aspects, Game theory, Game-theoretic, Moral philosophy, Noncooperative game, Selfish behaviours, Social benefits, Social contract, Social welfare
@inproceedings{davoust_social_2020,
title = {Social contracts for non-cooperative games},
author = {A. Davoust and M. Rovatsos},
url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85082175399&doi=10.1145%2f3375627.3375829&partnerID=40&md5=972ba2201a1c2450895935dc03ec39b9},
doi = {10.1145/3375627.3375829},
isbn = {978-1-4503-7110-0},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-01-01},
booktitle = {AIES 2020 - Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society},
pages = {43–49},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery, Inc},
abstract = {In future agent societies, we might see AI systems engaging in selfish, calculated behavior, furthering their owners' interests instead of socially desirable outcomes. How can we promote morally sound behaviour in such settings, in order to obtain more desirable outcomes? A solution from moral philosophy is the concept of a social contract, a set of rules that people would voluntarily commit to in order to obtain better outcomes than those brought by anarchy. We adapt this concept to a game-theoretic setting, to systematically modify the payoffs of a non-cooperative game, so that agents will rationally pursue socially desirable outcomes. We show that for any game, a suitable social contract can be designed to produce an optimal outcome in terms of social welfare. We then investigate the limitations of applying this approach to alternative moral objectives, and establish that, for any alternative moral objective that is significantly different from social welfare, there are games for which no such social contract will be feasible that produces non-negligible social benefit compared to collective selfish behaviour. © 2020 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).},
keywords = {Agent society, Agents, Behavioral research, Ethical aspects, Game theory, Game-theoretic, Moral philosophy, Noncooperative game, Selfish behaviours, Social benefits, Social contract, Social welfare},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
In future agent societies, we might see AI systems engaging in selfish, calculated behavior, furthering their owners' interests instead of socially desirable outcomes. How can we promote morally sound behaviour in such settings, in order to obtain more desirable outcomes? A solution from moral philosophy is the concept of a social contract, a set of rules that people would voluntarily commit to in order to obtain better outcomes than those brought by anarchy. We adapt this concept to a game-theoretic setting, to systematically modify the payoffs of a non-cooperative game, so that agents will rationally pursue socially desirable outcomes. We show that for any game, a suitable social contract can be designed to produce an optimal outcome in terms of social welfare. We then investigate the limitations of applying this approach to alternative moral objectives, and establish that, for any alternative moral objective that is significantly different from social welfare, there are games for which no such social contract will be feasible that produces non-negligible social benefit compared to collective selfish behaviour. © 2020 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).