
Slide

Centre Interdisciplinaire
de Recherche et d’Innovation
en Cybersécurité et Société
de Recherche et d’Innovation
en Cybersécurité et Société
1.
Mehrban, A.; Moudoud, H.; Brik, B.; Khoukhi, L.; Houda, Z. A. El
Game-Theoretic Security Orchestration for Cross-RIC Policy Conflicts in O-RAN Article d'actes
Dans: IEEE Int Conf Commun, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2026, ISBN: 15503607 (ISSN); 979-831954209-0 (ISBN), (Journal Abbreviation: IEEE Int Conf Commun).
Résumé | Liens | BibTeX | Étiquettes: Computation theory, Computer system firewalls, Cryptography, Game theory, Game-theoretic, Multiple vendors, Network architecture, Network security, Networks security, Open radio access network, Open RAN, Policy conflict, Radio access networks, Security orchestration, Service management, Service orchestration, SMO, Xapp/rapp conflict, xApp/rApp conflicts
@inproceedings{mehrbanGameTheoreticSecurityOrchestration2026,
title = {Game-Theoretic Security Orchestration for Cross-RIC Policy Conflicts in O-RAN},
author = {A. Mehrban and H. Moudoud and B. Brik and L. Khoukhi and Z. A. El Houda},
url = {https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105045343135?origin=resultslist},
doi = {10.1109/ICC59461.2026.11587926},
isbn = {15503607 (ISSN); 979-831954209-0 (ISBN)},
year = {2026},
date = {2026-01-01},
booktitle = {IEEE Int Conf Commun},
publisher = {Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.},
abstract = {In Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN), disaggregated network components can interact through specialized xApps or rApps from multiple vendors. Despite the flexibility of operations and the dynamism of functions enabled by the open architecture, this openness can cause conflicts in security policy enforcement (e.g., encryption levels, key rotation, firewall restrictiveness), formally defined as thresholded divergences on shared or interdependent security parameters, where one app wants to set a stricter rule while another wants a more lenient policy simultaneously. The current solutions of "first-come"or "last-write"make the change one-sided for the benefit of a single app, while other apps may be harmed by the result, and at a network level, security and stability can be compromised. In this paper, we propose a novel Game-Theoretic Security Orchestrator (GTSO) that operates at the Service Management and Orchestration (SMO) layer, with cross-RIC scope, and is responsible for resolving parameter conflicts across xApps and rApps. GTSO treats xApps/rApps as strategic players and negotiates convergent solutions using game-theoretic models such as non-cooperative Nash games, cooperative bargaining, and leader-follower (Stackelberg) that guide competing control applications toward stable equilibrium points, while exchanging strategy summaries over secure channels to protect sensitive details and enhance overall network security. © 2026 IEEE.},
note = {Journal Abbreviation: IEEE Int Conf Commun},
keywords = {Computation theory, Computer system firewalls, Cryptography, Game theory, Game-theoretic, Multiple vendors, Network architecture, Network security, Networks security, Open radio access network, Open RAN, Policy conflict, Radio access networks, Security orchestration, Service management, Service orchestration, SMO, Xapp/rapp conflict, xApp/rApp conflicts},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
In Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN), disaggregated network components can interact through specialized xApps or rApps from multiple vendors. Despite the flexibility of operations and the dynamism of functions enabled by the open architecture, this openness can cause conflicts in security policy enforcement (e.g., encryption levels, key rotation, firewall restrictiveness), formally defined as thresholded divergences on shared or interdependent security parameters, where one app wants to set a stricter rule while another wants a more lenient policy simultaneously. The current solutions of "first-come"or "last-write"make the change one-sided for the benefit of a single app, while other apps may be harmed by the result, and at a network level, security and stability can be compromised. In this paper, we propose a novel Game-Theoretic Security Orchestrator (GTSO) that operates at the Service Management and Orchestration (SMO) layer, with cross-RIC scope, and is responsible for resolving parameter conflicts across xApps and rApps. GTSO treats xApps/rApps as strategic players and negotiates convergent solutions using game-theoretic models such as non-cooperative Nash games, cooperative bargaining, and leader-follower (Stackelberg) that guide competing control applications toward stable equilibrium points, while exchanging strategy summaries over secure channels to protect sensitive details and enhance overall network security. © 2026 IEEE.



